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Clark: Criminal Law
CRIMINAL LAW

STATE V. A"D: STATUTORY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE EMERGENCE OF FETAL
PERSONHOOD IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Medical science defines a fetus simply as "the product of conception
from the end of the eighth week to the moment of birth."' South Carolina
courts, however, take a broader view. In State v. Ard2 the South Carolina
Supreme Court recently held that a viable fetus is a person within the meaning
of the state's capital murder aggravating circumstances statute.3 The decision
continues a trend in South Carolina law affording greater protection to the
unborn.4 Only two other states have used logic similar to the court inArd when
determining that the killing of a viable fetus can turn an otherwise non-capital
crime into one punishable by death.5 This Note argues that the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Ard was sound for the following reasons: (1) its
logical consistency with South Carolina case law and long-recognized canons
of statutory construction, (2) its respect for the criminal defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to fair notice, and (3) its respect for a woman's Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy.
Part II of this Note reviews both the supreme court's decision in Ard
and historical trends in fetal rights. Part III examines the leading arguments
against adding fetal murder to the list of statutory aggravating circumstances
and suggests deficiencies in both their purely legal and policy-based
justifications.

I. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY 573 (25th ed. 1990).
2. 332 S.C. 370, 505 S.E.2d 328 (1998).

3. Id. at 377, 505 S.E.2d at 331.
4. See, e.g., Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1,8,492 S.E.2d 777,781 (1997) (holding that
a viable fetus is a person for purposes of child abuse and endangerment statutes of the South
Carolina Children's Code); State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 447, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984)
(holding that a viable fetus is a person for the purposes of a homicide action); Fowler v.
Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 613, 138 S.E.2d 42,44 (1964) (holding that a viable fetus is a person
capable ofmaintaining awrongful-death action); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257,263, 113 S.E.2d
790, 793 (1960) (holding that a viable fetus is a person who may recover damages for injuries
received in utero).
5. Through legislative action the killing of a fetus in Arizona is a statutory
aggravating circumstance for capital murder, and in Indiana the killing of a viable fetus is an
aggravating circumstance for capital murder. See ARIZ.REV. STAT.ANN. § 13-702(D)(10) (West
1989); IND. CODEANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(16) (Lexis 1998).
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BACKGROUND
A.

State v. Ard

Joseph Ard, the boyfriend ofMadalyn Coffey and father to her unborn
son, was convicted for murdering both with a single bullet to Ms. Coffey's
head.6 Mr. Ard's son was viable7 at the time of the shooting, but died in the
womb soon thereafter from asphyxiation. After Mr. Ard's conviction, the trial
judge instructed the jury that it could consider the South Carolina aggravating
circumstances statute for purposes of imposing the death penalty.9 In pertinent
part, the statute provides that the death penalty can be considered when "[t]wo
or more persons were murdered by the defendant by one act or pursuant to one
scheme or course of conduct" ' or the act results in "[t]he murder of a child
eleven years of age or under.""1 The jury sentenced Mr. Ard to death, and he
appealed the sentence on the theory that an unborn but viable fetus is not a
"person" or a "child!' within the meaning of the South Carolina aggravating
circumstances statute. 2 The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed. 3
Writing for the majority, Justice Burnett noted that the legislature
added subitem nine to the list of statutory aggravating circumstances only after
the court's decision in Statev. Home, 4 which held that "an action for homicide
may be maintained" if the fetus is viable.' 5 Because courts presume the
legislature knows of judicial decisions construing legislation when enacting
statutes concerning related subjects,' the majority concluded that "it would be
inconsistent to conclude that a viable fetus is a person for purposes of murder,
but not ... for purposes of a statutory aggravating circumstance to murder."'"
Justice Moore concurred in the result only. 8 Arguing that statutory
aggravating circumstances language must be strictly construed against the State

6. Ard, 332 S.C. at 374, 505 S.E.2d. at 330.

7. A fetus is viable when its life may be sustained "indefinitely outside the womb by
natural or artificial life-supportive systems." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1565 (6th ed. 1990). In
South Carolina it is presumed that a fetus is not viable until the 24th week of pregnancy. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
8. Ard, 332 S.C. at 374-75, 505 S.E.2d at 330.
9. Id. at 376, 505 S.E.2d at 330-31. Of the 37 states that allow the death penalty, all
agree that the death sentence cannot be imposed unless the sentencer finds "certain facts relating
to the crime or to the defendant that elevate the offense above the norm of other first degree
murders." Richard A. Rosen, The "'EspeciallyHeinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Cases-TheStandardlessStandard,64 N.C. L. REV. 941,941 (1986).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
11. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(10).
12. Ard, 332 S.C. at 376, 505 S.E.2d at 331.
13. Id.
14. 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984).
15. Id. at 447, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
16. Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 6, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1997).
17. Ard, 332 S.C. at 377, 505 S.E.2d at 331.
18. Id. at 387, 505 S.E.2d at 337 (Moore, J., concurring).
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and in favor of the defendant, he observed that the age-defined class of child
should not be expanded to include the unborn. 9 Moreover, Justice Moore
averred that absent "full legislative debate and deliberation" the court should
not render a decision that could potentially lead prosecutors to pursue the death
penalty against mothers who aborted viable fetuses." By discussing the
potential conflict between the interests of the mother and the fetus, Justice
Moore demonstrated how far notions of fetal rights have evolved from the
common-law view.
B.

HistoricalCurrents in FetalRights

Before the development of the common law, "[i]t was anciently holden
that the causing of an abortion by giving a potion to, or striking a woman big
with child, was murder."2 Likewise, a woman who procured an abortion at any
stage of pregnancy was guilty of murder.' However, during the thirteenth
century, the law began to distinguish between children born alive and fetuses
killed in utero. Only those born alive could be victims of murder insofar as
"none can judge whether it be a child before it be seen, and known whether it
be a monster or not."'
The "born-alive" rule took root in the English common law, but its
rationale was modified to address modem causal concerns about a child's death
when the mother suffered a battery.24 Sir William Blackstone canonized the
born-alive rule in his Commentarieson the Laws ofEngland "To kill a child
in its mother's womb is now no murder, but a great misprision: but if the child
be born alive and dieth by reason of the portion or bruises it received in the
womb, it seems, by the better opinion, to be murder... ."" In America the rule
outlasted British control of the colonies and was widely recognized in

19. Id. at 388, 505 S.E.2d at 337.
20. Id.
21. State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 54 (1849). However, penalties for harming the fetus
could vary. "If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit departfrom her, and
yet no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished, according as the woman's husband will lay
upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine." Exodus 21:22
22. Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child,
64 A.L.R.5th 671, 686 (1998).
23. ANDRow HORNE, THE MIRROUR OF JusTicas 209 (Augustus M. Kelley 1968)

(1903).
24. See, e.g., Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a
PenumbralorNinth-Amendment Right About to Arisefrom the Nineteenth-CenturyLegislative
Ashes of a Fourteenth-CenturyCommon-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y. L. F. 335, 336-40 (1971).
"Historically, the inadequacy ofmedical technology to determine the cause of death justified this
distinction [between infants born alive and fetuses]." Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an
Unborn Child: JurisprudentialInconsistencies in Wrongful Death, CriminalHomicide, and
Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 933, 952 (1995).
25. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *198.
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American jurisprudence by the end of the nineteenth century.26
The rationale for the born-alive rule began to show its age as American
law entered the modem era. Minnesota became the first state to disregard the
common-law rule by recognizing a wrongful-death claim on behalf of an
unborn but viable fetus.27 Other states followed in rapid succession, prompting
what has been termed "the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled
rule in the whole history of the law of torts."'28 Today a majority of states reject
the born-alive rule for wrongful-death claims.29
Commentators chronicling this shift have noted that recent advances
in embryology and medical technology have made medical proof of causation
in these cases increasingly reliable." With the wrongful-death-causation hurdle
cleared, courts in some jurisdictions have flatly declared that "[a] viable fetus
... is undeniably alive and undeniably human."'" However, despite widespread
recognition of the fetus as a person in tort law, courts have been less willing to
award protection to the viable fetus in the criminal context.
Over thirty American jurisdictions decline to protect an unborn but
viable fetus under state homicide or criminal manslaughter statutes.32 Many of
these jurisdictions refuse to abandon the born-alive rule in criminal law despite
their recognition of fetal personhood for wrongful-death claims.33 A standard
26. See, e.g., Cooper, 22 N.J.L. at 54-55 (rejecting the ancient rule of fetal murder in
favor of the born-alive standard); Klasing, supra note 24, at 952 (observing that American courts
"uniformly adopt[ed] the 'born-alive' rule during the nineteenth century").
27. Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Minn. 1949).
28. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
29. Klasing, supra note 24, at 952; Christopher P. Edwards, Note, DiDonato v.
Wortman and Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus in North Carolina: The Case Against
UnreasonablyRestrictingDamages,66 N.C.L. REV. 1291,1299 (1988); see, e.g., Sunmerfield
v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (Ariz. 1985) (rejecting the notion "that if the viable infant
dies immediately before birth it is not a 'person' but that if it dies immediately after birth it is
a 'person'); DiDonato v. Wortrnan, 358 S.E.2d 489,493 (N.C. 1987) (concluding that a viable
fetus, killed in utero, has the same right to maintain a wrongful-death action as a child born
alive).
30. "[i]t is undisputed that [today] medicine is generally able to prove the corpus
delicti ofthe homicide of the unborn child." Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide ofthe Unborn Child:
The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAt. U. L. REV. 563, 579 (1987).
31. See, e.g., DiDonato,358 S.E.2d at 491.
32. See, e.g., State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that "there are no such crimes as vehicular homicide and DWI manslaughter of a viable but
unborn child"); White v. State, 232 S.E.2d 57, 57 (Ga. 1977) (holding that evidence could not
establish crime of murder unless child was born alive); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C.
1989) (refusing to abandon the born-alive rule in favor of a viability standard); State ex rel.
Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807, 812 (W. Va. 1984) (declining to alter common-law bornalive principle by judicial fiat).
33. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (111. 1980) ("Differing objectives
and considerations in tort and criminal law foster the development of different principles
governing the same factual situation."); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257, 1259 (R.I. 1982)
(observing that the state wrongful-death statute was "properly subject to a liberal application,"
but the homicide statute "must be... narrowly construed") (citing State v. Simmons, 327 A.2d
843 (R.I. 1974)).
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reason given for the distinction is thejudiciary's duty to construe criminal laws
strictly.3 4 In State v. McCall35 the Florida District Court of Appeal typified the
contradictory logic of jurisprudence in this area. Claiming that "[w]e do not
hold that a viable fetus is not alive nor... that a person should not be punished
' the court nevertheless
for causing its death,"36
declined to employ the state
homicide statute to punish a drunk driver for killing a nine-month old fetus.37
Justice McGraw of the West Virgina Supreme Court once responded to this
dichotomy by observing that "[i]n simple terms, you can, under our law, collect
but not convict."" The gulfbetween the civil and criminal law seems especially
odd to some, given the complimentary objectives of wrongful-death and
homicide statutes.39 Some state legislatures have responded to this
inconsistency by abolishing the born-alive rule through "feticide" statutes that
protect viable fetuses from harm suffered in the womb.' However, the statutes
of South Carolina, Massachusetts, and-Oklahoma contain no such provision,
although the judiciaries of those states have created a feticide law by
interpreting the word "person." in their prospective homicide statutes to include
an unborn but viable fetus.4' South Carolina's decision to reject the born-alive
rule in fetal homicide cases was the first step towards the Ard decision. The
decision also highlighted the supreme court's desire to fashion a consistent
jurisprudence of fetal rights within the state.
C.

JudicialProtectionof the Fetus in South Carolina

The first South Carolina decision to afford protection to the unborn
fetus was Hall v. Murphy.42 In Hall a pregnant woman and her viable fetus
were injured in an automobile collision.43 The child was delivered alive after

34. See, e.g., Beale,376 S.E.2d at 4 (finding that a fetus is not aperson under criminal
law because criminal statutes mustbe strictly construed); Statev. Oliver, 563 A.2d 1002,100304 & n.5 (Vt. 1989) (holding that the legislature's omission of the term "fetus" in the penal code
indicated its desire to omit the unborn); Atkinson, 332 S.E.2d at 812 (holding that the homicide
statute does not apply to an unborn but viable fetus).
35. 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
36. Id. at 877.
37. Id.
38. Atkinson, 332 S.E.2d at 812 (McGraw, J., dissenting).
39. Wrongful-death statutes have been described as aiming "to protect human
life ... and to stimulate diligence in the protection of the natural right to live." Breed v. Atlanta,
B. & C.R. Co., 4 So. 2d 315, 316 (Ala. 1941). Homicide statutes are likewise aimed at the
protection ofhuman life by providing deterrents to dangerous criminal behavior. Forsythe, supra
note 30, at 610.
40. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (creating criminal penalty for
murder of a fetus); N.Y. PENALLAW§ 125.00 (McKinney 1998) (establishing crime offeticide).
41. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Mass. 1984); Hughes v. State,
868 P.2d 730,734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Statev. Home, 282 S.C. 444,447,319 S.E.2d 703,
704 (1984).
42. 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
43. Id. at 259, 113 S.E.2d at 791.
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the accident, but died only four hours later." Subsequently, the mother brought
a wrongful-death action against the driver of the other vehicle." The court then
faced the question of whether injuries suffered before birth could support a
cause of action on behalf of the fetus." Many jurisdictions denied such claims
after the famous case of Dietrich v. Inhabitantsof Northampton,47 in which
Justice (then judge) Oliver Wendell Holmes opined that no recovery could be
had for injuries sustained by a fetus because it was simply a part of the
mother." Justice Oxner, however, concluded on behalf of a unanimous South
Carolina Supreme Court that to reject the wrongful-death claim because4
injuries were suffered before birth would be "unsound, illogical and unjust." 1
Although the court relied on the fact that the child was born, it set a precedent
in South Carolina law by resting its decision frmily on the independent status
of the fetus.5 0
The court next addressed the personhood of the fetus in Fowler v.
Woodward.s" Like Hall, Fowler involved a wrongful-death claim stemming
from an automobile accident in which a viable fetus was injured. s2 However,
the fetus in Fowler died in utero,s3 thus squarely presenting the court with the
validity of the born-alive rule. The court dismissed the notion that live birth
was a prerequisite to a cause of action.54 Instead, the unanimous decision
affirmed Hall's broader notion of the viable fetus as an independent person
with rights separate from the mother."5
Twenty years after Fowler, the supreme court again unanimously
expanded fetal protection in State v. Horne.56Horneinvolved whether the word
"person" in the state homicide statute applied to an unborn but viable fetus. s7
The appellant was convicted under the statute for killing his unborn son while
attacking his pregnant wife with a kitchen knife. 8 Writing for the majority,
Justice Shaw held that in light ofFowler,"[i]twouldbe grossly inconsistent for
us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purposes of imposing civil
liability while refusing to give it a similar classification in the criminal
context." 9 The decision rested on the court's desire to develop the common

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
137 Mass. 14 (1884).
Id. at 17.
Hall,236 S.C. at 262, 113 S.E.2d at 793.
Id.
244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964).
Id. at 611, 138 S.E.2d at 43.
Id.
Id. at 613, 138 S.E.2d at44.
Id. at 615, 138 S.E.2d at45.
282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984).
Id. at 446, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
Id.

59. Id. at 447, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
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law of South Carolina, rather than an investigation into the statute's intended
scope.' The opinion gave little heed to the fact that no South Carolina case had
declared a viable fetus a person within the particular context of criminal
homicide: "The fact this particular issue has not been raised or ruled on before
does not mean we are prevented from declaring the common law as it should
be." Nonetheless, the court reversed the appellant's conviction on the grounds
that judicial recognition of the crime of feticide should not be applied
retroactively.62
The controversial case of Whitner v. State a continued the court's
efforts to define consistently the viable fetus as a "person!' under state law.
Writner involved the conviction of a mother who ingested crack cocaine during
the third trimester of her pregnancy, causing her unborn child to become
addicted to the drug.64 She was charged under the South Carolina Children's
Code, which imposes criminal penalties on those who have legal custody of a
child or helpless person, but who fail to provide the necessary care or
attention.65 Ms. Whitner pled guilty to the offense and was sentenced to eight
years in prison.' Afterwards, Ms. Whitner filed a petition for post conviction
relief, arguing that the circuit court convicted her of a non-existent offense67
because the term "child" or "helpless person" under the Children's Code did
not encompass a viable fetus.68 In a tersely written opinion, the supreme court
69
affirmed Whitner's conviction.
Justice Toal, writing for the majority, focused the court's opinion on
the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the term "person" in South Carolina law."
An analysis of the decisions in Hall, Fowler, and Home led Justice Toal to

60. "This Court has the right and the duty to develop the common law of South
Carolina to better serve an ever-changing society as a whole." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 328 S.C. 1,492 S.E.2d 777 (1997).
64. Id. at 4, 492 S.E.2d at 778-79.
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The statute provides:
Any person having the legal custody of any child
or helpless person, who shall, without lawful excuse,
refuse orneglect to provide, as defined in § 20-7-490,
the proper care and attention for such child or
helpless person, so that the life, health or comfort of
such child or helpless person is endangered or is
likely to be endangered, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be punished within the
discretion of the circuit court.
Id.
66. Whitner, 328 S.C. at 4,492 S.E.2d at 778-79.
67. IfMs. Whitner's argument was valid, the circuit court's acceptance of her guilty
plea would have been void: "[A] circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty
plea to a nonexistent offense." Id. at 5, 492 S.E.2d at 779.
68. Id. at 4-5, 492 S.E.2d at 779.
69. Id. at 19, 492 S.E.2d at 786.
70. Id. at 8, 492 S.E.2d at 780.
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observe that "South Carolina law has long recognized that viable fetuses are
persons holding certain legal rights and privileges."'7' In particular, Justice Toal
explained that the court's jurisprudence in Hall,Fowler, and Home was not
based on a desire to protect the relationship between mother and child, but
rather the "protection of the viable fetus. ' 2 Accordingly, the court cohcluded
that there was no rational basis for holding that a viable fetus was not a person
under the Children's Code and characterized arguments to the contrary as
"absurd. '3 Whitnermarkedthe court's clearest expression of South Carolina's
policy to treat unborn children with the same solicitude afforded the born.
State v. Ard followed Whittner as a natural step in the supreme court's
continuing expansion of fetal protection across doctrinal lines. However, the
Ard court's decision to add fetal murder to the list of statutory aggravating
circumstances raises potential objections based on statutory construction, the
criminal defendant's right to fair notice, and a woman's fundamental right of
privacy.
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Objection One: Strict Statutory Construction

The statutory aggravating circumstances statute at issue inArdpermits
the jury to consider the death penalty for a defendant who pleads guilty to or
is convicted of murder.74 The law is a criminal penal statute and must be strictly
construed under universally accepted norms of statutory construction.75 This
rule suggests that absent specific language in the statute defining a viable fetus
as a "person," a strict construction demands excluding that class from the
statute. As Justice Moore expressed in his dissent in Ard, "[a]ll murders
involve the killing of a person but, under our statutory scheme, not all murders
are capital offenses." 6 For the court to imply a term in the statute that the
legislature could easily have made explicit would serve, in effect, to seize the
stylus from the legislator's hand so as to draft a law of the court's own design.
However, the strict construction of a statute does not force the
judiciary to interpret its words narrowly.77 Instead, "[w]ords and phrases which

71. Id. at 6, 492 S.E.2d at 779.
72. Id. at 13, 492 S.E.2d at 783.
73. Id. at 8, 492 S.E.2d at 780.
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
75. The requirement that a penal statute be strictly construed "is perhaps not much
less old than construction itself." United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
The rule rests "on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative,
not in the judicial department." Id.
76. State v. Ard, 332 S.C. 370, 388, 505 S.E.2d 328, 337 (1998) (Moore, J.,
dissenting).
77. Perhaps the most venerated canon of strict constructionism is the notion that "[a]
statute cannot go beyond its text." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 522 (1960).
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have received judicial construction before enactment are to be understood
' In the Ard case a substantial body of case law
according to that construction."78
defined the word person to include viable fetuses well before the legislature
added the killing of two or more persons as a statutory aggravating
circumstance to murder.79 The inclusory definitions were never limited to the
specific facts or doctrinal setting of each case, such as wrongful-death claims
or prosecutions under the homicide statute. To the contrary, the holdings
"rested primarily on theplainmeaning of the word 'person' in light of existing
medical knowledge concerning fetal development."8 ° Because South Carolina
case law infused the legislative term "person" with a particular meaning, only
an interpretation that ventures beyond the terms of the statute could exclude
viable fetuses from the judicially defined class.
Furthermore, statutes of whatever stripe must be read "in the light of
the common law."'" In developing the common law, the supreme court
implicitly found that the definition of "person" found in the wrongful-death
statute" was compatible with the strict constructionist requirements of the state
homicide statute. Only a startling break with the common-law tradition could
allow strict construction now to demand the exclusion of viable fetuses within
the criminal law context. Moreover, it would be alarming to find that strict
statutory construction would allow the definition of "person" to be compatible
between civil and criminal contexts, but not necessarily consistent within
criminal contexts. Absent an express command from the legislature, the court
rightly refrained from such interpretive innovation.
B.

Objection Two: The Fair WarningDoctrine

The Fourteenth Amendment gives criminal defendants the right to "fair
warning of the act which is made punishable as a crime."" After Ard the jury
may consider the death penalty for the defendant when he has murdered a
viable fetus in connection with another homicide. Under the Fair Warning
Doctrine, the defendant might claim that the vague nature of viability made it
impossible for him to know that the fetus was a person under the law:
Viability is not an absolute concept and its
limits will keep changing as medical
technology advances. Moreover, even when
similar medical care is available, the
viability of individual fetuses at the same

78. Id. at 524 (footnote omitted).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
80. Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 8, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1997) (emphasis added).
81. LLEWELLYN, supra note 77, at 522.
82. Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257,263, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1960).
83. State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444,447, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1994).
84. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 626 (Cal. 1970).
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gestational age may be different. It seems
that viability is not a bright line test upon
which5 courts and physicians can easily
8
rely.
Because of the shifting standard, the defendant could claim that the
aggravating circumstances statute unfairly subjects him to the death penalty for
what he believed to be a non-capital crime.86 One might initially respond to
such a claim by doubting whether any criminal refers to the state statutes before
committing a crime in order to get fair warning of the possible consequences.
However, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the concept of
fair notice hinges only on whether the criminal defendant could objectively
receive adequate notice from the wording of the statute."
Nonetheless, the Fair Warning Doctrine does not mandate that notice
of criminal liability be rendered with surgical precision. Instead, the proper
standard requires only that the statute afford the world at large general
knowledge of wrongful conduct." The Code of Laws of South Carolina
("Code") provides that viability is the "stage of human development when the
fetus is potentially able to live outside of the mother's womb with or without
the aid of artificial life support systems."8 9 A person of average intelligence
could reasonably expect that a pregnant woman may at leastpotentiallyharbor
a fetus capable of living outside of the womb on life support. Even though
viability may vary from case to case, this variance is immaterial because factual
determinations are routinely necessary to establish the elements of statutory
offenses.'

85. Agota Peterfy, Fetal Viability as a Thresholdto Personhood: A LegalAnalysis,
16 J. LEGAL MED. 607, 632 (1995).
86. The defendant's challenge would not be without merit simply because the
aggravating circumstances statute is only a sentencingstatute. Commentators recognize that the
doctrine of vagueness "can and should be applied to evaluate aggravating circumstances in
capital sentencing proceedings." Rosen, supranote 9, at 956.
87. According to the Supreme Court:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will
carefully consider the text of the law before he
murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the
warning fair, so far as possible the line should be
clear.
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
88. See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952)
(noting that only a reasonable degree of certainty is required in criminal statutes).
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emphasis added).
90. For example, the Code of Laws of South Carolina also provides that the death
penalty can be considered for a murderer when "[t]he offender ...
knowingly created a great risk
of death to more than one person in a public place." Id. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1998). "Great risk of death" is not defined in the Code, but is a question of fact for the jury. Id.
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Furthermore, fair notice challenges are certain to fail after the twentyfourth week of pregnancy because the Code expressly creates a presumption
of fetal viability after that period. 9' In the Ard case, Mr. Ard murdered his wife
while she was eight and a half months pregnant.9 The Fair Warning Doctrine
does not provide a safe haven for defendants like Mr. Ard who are certainly
aware that a viable fetus will suffer because of their felonious conduct.
C.

The Abortion Right Under the FourteenthAmendment

Justice Moore sounds a cautionary note in his dissent in Ard.
Observing that on appeal the State argued that the majority's opinion might
subject a woman to the death penalty for aborting a viable fetus, Justice Moore
called for "extreme caution" to guide the court's determination of the issue.93
The philosophical grounds for Justice Moore's objection to such a penalty are
unclear. His concerns possibly resonate from an opinion about the mother's
rights in relation to the viable fetus. If the viable fetus is a child protected from
murder under state law, then a mother can be excluded only from suffering the
same penalty as others for the act of murder if she possesses countervailing
rights which trump those of the viable fetus. Some commentators contend that
penalizing a mother for aborting a viable fetus subomes the woman's
fundamental right to sovereignty over her own body:
Women's right to self-sovereignty also
remains contingent upon the state's interest
in the fetus.... If the fetus is granted rights
as a person, then the self-sovereignty of
women may be undermined by the dual
sovereignty housed within the pregnant
body. The assumption that two sets of rights
may exist within one body makes women
uniquely vulnerable to state intrusion, as the
state may be aligned with the fetus against

(establishing the authority of the jury to determine the existence of statutory aggravating
circumstances); see also People v. Henderson, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 1158 (1990) (noting that
the law is "resplendent with elements containing factual questions dependent upon the particular
facts of the case").
91. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-41-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
92. State v. Ard, 332 S.C. 370, 375, 505 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1998).
93. Id. at 388, 505 S.E.2d at 337 (Moore, J., dissenting). The "personhood" of the
viable fetus was not decided for South Carolina or any other state by the United States Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe Court merely concluded that "the word
'person,' as used in the FourteenthAmendment, does not include the unborn." Id. at 158
(emphasis added). The states, through their own constitutions or statutes, are still free to define
person as they see fit. Roe simply requires that a mother's aborting of her viable fetus be
decriminalized in the limited context ofconsensual abortions necessary to preserve the mother's
life or health. See infra note 95.
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the woman.94
However, the law does not assume that the state's interest in protecting
a viable fetus is per se subordinate to the mother's interests." However, the
suggestion that a viable fetus is a child for purposes of murder could
conceivably implicate a mother's right to terminate her pregnancy under these
circumstances. Neither the South Carolina homicide statute nor the aggravating
circumstances statute makes an exception for the killing of a viable fetus to
preserve the life or health of the mother.
It is unlikely that the Ard decision forces the state homicide and
aggravating circumstance statutes to include a woman's right to abortion under
Roe. Section 44-41-10(a) of the Code defines an abortion as
the use of an instrument, medicine, drug, or
other substance or device with intent to
terminate the pregnancy of a woman known
to be pregnant for reasons other than to
increase the probability of a live birth, to
preserve the life or health of the child after
live birth, or to remove a dead fetus.96
Section 44-41-20(c) of the Code criminalizes abortion in the third trimester
unless necessary "to preserve the life or health of the woman."97 If a woman
voluntarily undergoes an abortion during the third trimester, or herself
"employs any device or instrument or other means with intent to produce an
abortion, unless it is necessary to preserve her life," she is guilty only of a
misdemeanor under the Code, punishable "by imprisonment for a term of not
more than
two years or [a] fine [of] not more than one thousand dollars, or
98
both.

Because the Code currently punishes the voluntary termination of a

94. CYNTHiAR.DANIELS, ATWOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATEPOWERANDTHEPOLITICSOF

FETAL RIGHTS 136 (1993) (footnote omitted).
95. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. Roe held that a woman has a fundamental right to an
abortion until the point of fetal viability. Id. at 164-65. However, when viability is reached the
state develops a compelling interest in the life of the fetus and may proscribe abortions
altogether, except when risk to the life or health of the mother is involved. Id. at 163-64.
Additionally, Roe established a rigid trimester framework that prohibited the states from
interfering with the procurement of an abortion during the first trimester and allowed the state
to regulate the procedure during the second trimester in "ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health." Id. at 164. The subsequent case ofPlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), jettisoned the trimester scheme. Id. at 873. Casey held that the states can regulate the
abortion decision throughout pregnancy in order to promote "the State's profound interest in
potential life," unless the regulation is an "undue burden" and places a "substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion." Id. at 878.
96. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-41-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1998).
97. Id. § 44-41-20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
98. Id. § 44-41-80(b).
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pregnancy during fetal viability by short prison sentences and fines, it is rather
doubtful that the aggravating circumstances statute expresses the notion that
such conduct is punishable by death. The statutory construction rule of inpari
materia" supports this conclusion: "[S]tatutes dealing with the same subject
matter must be construed... and harmonized to give effect to each other."'"
Thus, "[w]here one statute deals with a subject in detail with reference to a
particular situation.., and another statute deals with the same subject in
general and comprehensive terms ... the particular statute will be construed as
controlling in the particular situation.''.
In the present case, the abortion statute deals specifically with a
woman's intentional termination of a pregnancy. On the other hand, the
homicide and aggravating circumstance statutes consider the killing of a child
without specific reference to either pregnancy or a woman's intent. These facts
suggest that the abortion statute alone governs a woman's unlawful but
voluntary termination of her pregnancy, leaving the constitutional right to
abortion for health or safety reasons undisturbed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Hall v. Murphy the South Carolina Supreme Court sparked a
revolution in the way that the state's common law viewed the viable fetus.
Since its decision in Hall,the court has established a consistent jurisprudence
of fetal personhood that recognizes viability as the point beyond which citizens
may be liable for injuries inflicted upon the fetus. This notion of personhood
has relied upon the status of the fetus as an individual possessed of "certain
legal rights and privileges,"' 2 which must in turn be reckoned against the
opposing interests of the born. State v. Ard strikes the appropriate balance. By
allowing the murder of the viable fetus to have the same weight as the murder
of any other child for purposes of statutory aggravating circumstances, the law
preserves consistency in its protection of the interests of the unborn. And by
recognizing fetal personhood under the aggravating circumstances statute, the
law keeps faith with the interests of women and the criminally accused, neither
of whom suffers a usurpation of constitutional interests under Ard. Instead,
under Ard both the fetus and the members of the community into which it will
emerge are compelled to stand in respectful relation to one another under the
law.
James Clark

99. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990) ("Upon the same matter or
subject.").
100. State v. Williams, 230 S.E.2d 515,517 (N.C. 1976).
101. State v. Leeper, 296 S.E.2d 7, 9 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
102. Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 6, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1997).
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